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The recent stabilization attempts in Argentina (December 1989 and January 1990)
and Brazil (March 1990) which entailed the freezing and forced conversion of the
government's liabilities implicitly or explicitly assumed either that a rational inflationary
bubble existed orthatthe internal publicsector debt was following anexplosive path [Welch
1990]. Such contentions, however, were never tested in any systematic way prior to the
effective repudiation of (a portion) of the internal public debt. The empirical evidence
reported in this study strongly rejects the existence of either condition.
The internal debt reschedulings that were based upon these apparently false
assumptions followed a long series offailed stabilization attempts in each country. Figures
1 and 2 show the seemingly relentless march toward hyperinflation in both countries during
the 1980 and identify the "heterodox shock" stabilization plans which of the governments
tried and failed to abate inflation.' In Argentina, the first and most successful plan, the
Austral Plan, lasted from June 1985 to the elections of September 1987. After most price
and wage controls had been dismantled by April 1987, inflation accelerated from April to
through the September elections. In early 1988, a strict orthodox plan based upon fiscal
restraint was implemented. In preparation for the presidential elections in 1989, a new
IThese programs entailed a combination of exchange rate pegging, incomes policies,
monetary reform, deindexation of wages and financial assets, and (mostly temporary and
failed) fiscal adjustment. For a more detailed institutional analysis of this period in
Argentina and Brazil, see Welch (1991b). Also, see Beckerman (1991) for an analysis of
the Argentine experience. Foranalysis ofthe "heterodox shock" Austral and Cruzado Plans,
see Bruno et al (1988).
1Figure 1
Argentina: Monthly (logarithmic) Inflation Rates July 1985 to
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3"shock" policy was put into place in August 1988 named the "Spring Plan." As in the prior
attempts, the package fell apart in February 1989 after initial success culminating in
hyperinflation in June and July 1989. A final "heterodox" policy was implemented
immediately afterPresident Menem took office in July 1989 based mainly upon exchange
rate stabilization. This policy ended in a speculative run onthe Central Bank in December
of 1989.
The Brazilian experience shows a larger number of stabilization "plans" than the
Argentine case with poorer results. The original "heterodox" policy package, the "Cruzado
Plan," was implemented at the end of February 1986. By the end of 1989, the plan had
completely broken down only to be followed by another "heterodox" attempt in April 1987
named the "Bresser Plan" after the new Minister of Finance Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira.
The Bresser Plan collapsed at the end of 1987 and was succeeded by an orthodox
stabilization effort based uponfiscal adjustment euphemistically referred to as a "beans and
rice" (Brazilian "bread and butter") policy. By December, inflation had accelerated to such
a point that a new "shock" plan - the "Summer Plan" -was initiated in January 1989. Again,
after initial success, inflation accelerated in August of 1989 as the as full fledged indexation
returned to the system.
Figures 1 and 2 clearly show that as each subsequent package unraveled in each
country, inflation accelerated to levels higher thanthose thathadexisted priorto the policy's
implementation. A large debate ensued on the causes ofinflation in both ofthese countries
as well as Latin America. This paper addresses some of the issues and policy prescriptions
which are the fruit of this debate. According to models with rational expectations,
4hyperinflations could arise from a rational bubble due to the fact that current inflation is
determined by future expected inflation rates. Models of dynamic government budget
constraints also display the possibility of having a rational bubble on the value of real
internal debt.' Hence, even if a rational inflationary bubble does not exist, a debt bubble
could spawn a hyperinflation due to the acceleration in the growth of the monetary base
necessary to meet internal debt service.
Prior work [Welch 1991a] for the period 1970-1985 for both Brazil and Argentina
showed no evidence ofrational inflationary bubbles. Diba and Grossman (1988b) show that
if a rational bubble did not exist when fiat money was introduced, then no rational
inflationary bubble can exist at a later date. However, a reintroduction offiat moneywhich
is overvalued might do the trick. Perhaps one can envision the heterodox shock cum
monetary reform packages ofthe Austral Plan of 1985 in Argentina and the Cruzado Plan
of 1986 in Brazil as events which introduced a new fiat money not valued according to
fundamentals due to wage and price controls. I do not argue that the case described in
Diba and Grossman (1988b) is equivalent to these monetary reforms. However, for a
rational inflationary bubble to exist during the period prior to the recent stabilization
packages in each country, it had to be introduced in some such form.
The theoretical basis for the debt bubble-hyperinflation link is succinctly laid out in
2 Actually, government debt does not contain a bubble but acts like a bubble due to the
fact that it is rolled over. For convenience, I will a "rational internal debt bubble" refers to
an expected violation of the government's intertemporal budget constraint or, in other
words, the government is insolvent. For a nice discussion, see Trehan and Walsh (1988 and
1991) and Hakkio and Rush (1991). For general treatments of bubbles in an overlapping
generations model, see Tirole (1985).
5Blanchard and Fischer (1989: 512-517) and Bruno and Fischer (1990). Ifthe burden ofthe
debt renders the primary deficit of the government larger than the maximum seignorage
which can be obtained at constant inflation, then the government will continuously
accelerate the rate of growth of the monetary base to finance this high deficit. If
government debt is nominal, the hyperinflation will quickly erode the burden of this debt.
On the other hand, if the debt is "real," Le. indexed, the ability of inflation to deflate the
debt is limited and the government must accelerate money growth even faster [Dornbusch,
Blanchard, and Buiter 1986].' Ifsuch a situationwere to arise, one would find that the real
level of the internal debt would rise along with the inflation rate.
This paper explores the possibility that the monetary reform cum incomes policy
stabilizations in Argentina - the so-called Austral Plan of July 1985 - and Brazil - the so-
called Cruzado Plan of March 1986 - may have introduced rational inflationary and debt
"bubbles" to the respective economies. Whether or not the recent internal debt moratoria
undertaken by the Argentina and Brazilian governments is a reasonable policy for bursting
an alleged inflationary bubble is an open question.' Welch (1990), however, shows that if
there is an internal debt bubble, a moratorium on the internal debt without full fiscal
adjustment will temporarily improve the government's cash position but this improvement
'Theability for thegovernment to collect higherseignorage by continuously accelerating
money growth presupposes either adaptive inflation expectations or lagged adjustment of
real money balances.
'For a critical analysis, see Welch (1991b). Simulation results in Bastos Marques and
Werlang (1989) tell a similar story. In a related paper, Bastos Marques andWerlang (1990)
estimate the default premium in LetrasFiscais do Tesouro (LFT) in Brazil. They show that
the risk premium is very sensitive to increases in the probability of internal debt default.
6will ultimately degenerate as the bubble explodes faster in the post-moratorium period.
Recent developments in empirical economics allow testing for the necessary
conditions for inflation and debtbubbles in Argentina and Brazil. In contrast to the efforts
ofCasella (1989) who follows the procedure outlined by West (1985) for testing for bubbles
from structural forms in the German hyperinflation, this paper takes the non-structural
approach ofHamilton and Whiteman (1985) and Dibaand Grossman (1988a). The results,
therefore, do not depend upon the functional form ofthe demand for money function.' The
organizationofthis paper is as follows. The tests for government solvency are also not non-
strucutural in nature following Trehan and Walsh (1988 and 1991). The first section
outlines a classical model of inflation. The second section describes the stationarity
implications ofrational inflationary bubbles. The third presents a model ofthe government
internal debt determination. The fourth investigates the stationarity properties of real
government debt. Thefifth sectionpresents empirical evidence concerninginflationbubbles
in Argentina and Brazil while the sixth section presents empirical evidence on debt bubbles.
The seventh section summarizes the findings.
'Tirole (1985) criticizes the structural approach to bubbles tests which assume the adhoc
Cagan money demand function in that the bubble's evolution does not depend on interest
rates. He generalizes the solution for the price level in terms of intertemporal marginal
utilities [Tirole 1985: 1087]. The stochastic behavior of the bubble, however, is
observationally equivalent to the one posited in this paper as the bubble cannot be
differenced away.
7I. A Classical Model ofInOation
The choice ofa classical model reflects a need to present a simple model which can
theoretically generate a rational inflationary bubble. Even if the model is misspecified,
however, the misspecification could not hide any non-stationarities in the data. A full test
ofthe structure ofthis model for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico appears in Feliz and Welch
(1991).
The model starts with the money demand specification of Cagan (1956).
m, - P, = Y, - lXi, + E, (1)
where m. is the natural logarithm ofthe money stock, p, is the natural logarithm ofthe price
level, y, is the natural logarithm of real output, i, is the nominal interest rate, and €, is a zero
mean random error term all evaluated at time t.' The standard assumption describes €, as
a random walk of the form
(2)
'This error term can be viewed as one which is either viewed by market participants or
constructed by them. €" however, is not observed by the researcher. See Diba and
Grossman(1988a) and Campbell and Shiller (1987 and 1988). Further, the assumption that
€, follows a random walk as opposed to being stationary is not necessary for the results. A
stationary error process indicates that m" p" y" and i, are cointegrated in levels as opposed
to growth rates. Such a relationship more strictly rules out rational inflationarybubbles than
the tests used here.
8where '7, is white noise.'
The next feature ofthis classical model posits a Fisher relationship for the nominal
interest rate.
(3)
where rt is the real interest rate, E['J is the expectations operator, 'ITt+! = Pt+! - p, is the
logarithmic inflation rate, and <P, is the information set at time t. The model subsumes
rational expectations, i.e. individuals use all information available to them to form
expectations about future inflation rates.
Classical models usuallycontaina form ofthe "dichotomy" betweenrealvariables and
nominal variables. In this spirit, real output and real interest rates are assumed to follow
random walks (real output also has a drift).
Y, - Y'_I ; Y + wit
" - "-I ; w2t
where W1I and Wu are white noise.
(4)
(5)
Taking first differences on equation (1) and combined with equations 2-5 yields the
following expression.
'The assumption that €, follows a random walk, Le. m, p, y, and yare not cointegrated,
is not necessary for the conclusions of this paper. A stationary error term in the money
equation would rule out a fortiori rational inflationary bubbles.
9(6)
where JL. is the logarithmic growth of money and
(7)
is white noise.
Rearranging equation (6) yields
(8)
Taking expectations on equation (8) conditional on <1>'-1 yields
(9)
Substituting iterations of these rational forecasts n periods into the future into
equation (9) yields
(10)
There exists an infinitum of solutions to the difference equation (8). They will be
10of the form
ltt = Ft + Bt (11)
where F, represents the fundamental solution and B, represents a rational bubble. For the
evolution ofinflation expectations (and thus inflation) to be stable (no bubbles), they must
satisfy the following transversality condition
(12)
Ifequation (12) is satisfied, then the fundamental solution for inflation expectations
is
(13)
Inflation expectations are a function of real (constant) output growth and a weighted sum
of expected future money growth rates. The no bubbles solution to the inflation rate is
On the other hand, if the transversality condition is violated, a rational bubble can
exist. Forthe bubble to be consistent with expectations, it must evolve in the following way
11Solutions to (15) satisfy the stochastic difference equation
where the random variable C, satisfies
The solution of inflation expectations with a bubble is thus






1t, = IJ., - j + (19)
'To see this note that
1
E[Bt+11¢>,] - B, = -B,
It
Substituting this value into equation (8) yields the additive term B,.
12II Stationarity Properties of Inflation
The presence of bubbles carries a number of implications [Diba and Grossman
1988a: 522-523]. The first is that the presence ofbubbles precludes the stationarity of any
degree of differencing of the inflation series. Taking first differences of the bubble in
equation (16) using the lag operator L yields'
[1 -e:CXfl(l - L)B, = (1 - LK, (20)
One could continue differencing this representation of the bubble. The ARMA
representation of equation (20), however, will never be stationary (as the root of the AR
process lies inside the unit circle) nor invertible. The bubble introduces a non-stationarity
which cannot be differenced away.
The presence of bubbles would also rule out cointegration between inflation and
money growth. Rearranging equation (19) with a small change of notation yields
(21)
Suppose both inflation and money growth are stationary after first differencing (i.e.
integrated of order 1 or 1(1» and recall that the growth rate of real output is assumed to
be constant. In this classical representation, the left hand side of equation (21) is an
equilibrium relationship ofinflation and money growth with cointegrating vector E' = [1, -
"The following discussion follows Diba and Grossman's (1988a and 1988b).
131] and an intercept while the right hand represents the residuals Z.." If there are no
bubbles, the residuals are stationary and inflation and money growth are cointegrated of
order (1,1). In the presence of bubbles, however, the residuals of the cointegrating
regression are not stationary. Hence, if inflation and money growth are cointegrated, no
bubbles exist [Feliz 1990: 5]. Further, cointegration ofmoney growth and inflation rules out
any non-stationarity of the unobserved variables [Diba and Grossman 1988a: 525-526].
Hamilton and Whiteman (1985) come to similar conclusions by showing that if money
growth is stationary after d differences and inflation is stationary after differencing d times,
then speculative inflationary bubbles cannot exist.
The discussion thus far presupposes that rational deflationary bubbles cannot exist.
Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) show that rational
deflationary bubbles cannot exist in the context of infinitely lived optimizing agents. The
reasoning is that individuals would have to expect the purchasing power of their money
holdings to grow without bounds. The economy's productive capacity precludes such a
phenomenon and, therefore, rational individuals could not expect a deflationary bubble.
Consequently, the bubble cannot be negative at any point in time. Therefore, if B'+l ~ 0,
rearranging equation (16) yields
IOThe definition of Cointegration: Suppose an (Nxl) vector time series X. is integrated
of order d, i.e. is stationary after differencing d times, or I(d). The vector X. is said to be
cointegrated of order (d,b) or CI(d,b) if there exists a vector B such that Z, = B'X. is
integrated of order (d-b) [Granger and Engle 1987: 252].
14(22)
If B, = 0, since the expected value of "+1 is zero, then "+1 must equal zero with
probability one [Diba and Grossman 1988b: 41]. This non-negativity constraint on the
stochastic component ofthe bubble implies that ifthe bubble does not exist at time t, then
a rational bubble cannot start at time t+1 due to a large error, i.e. a sunspot. Ifa rational
bubble exists, therefore, it had to exist when fiat moneywas introduced. Inotherwords, fiat
money would have to be undervalued at its inception." The set of bubbles tests are
introduced and reported in section V to investigate whether the monetary reforms in
Argentina (1985) and Brazil (1986) introduced a rational inflationary bubble.
III A Model of Government Debt
This section develops a simple model ofgovernment internal debt formation." We
start with the government dynamic budget constraint
l!.D, + l!.M, = (G, - T,) + ip, + i;D,· (23)
"The non-negativity constraint also rules out bubbles which start and then burst. Such
a bubble could generate a stationary pattern of real money growth as bubbles burst and
reemerge. However, by the argument above, once a bubble has burst, a sunspot cannot
generate a new bubble. Hence, it seems unlikely that a bubble could somehow "hide" in
stationary real money growth.
"The model follows the discussion of Welch, Primo Braga, and Andre (1987) and
Trehan and Walsh (1988).
15where D, is internal government debt, M, is monetary base, G, is the totality ofgovernment
spending, T, is the totality of government non-borrowed revenues, i is the average rate of
interest on domestic government debt, i' is the average rate ofinterest onforeign debt, and
D', is the stock of government foreign debt, all at time t.
Letting the exchange rate be indexed to the inflation rate, equation (23) becomes
after some arranging
~ • e· M D'+l = (G, - T,) + (1 + p)(1 + 1t,}D, + (1 + p,)(1 + 1t,)D, - IJ. , (24)
Dividing both sides of equation (24) by the price level in the next period yields
= ...;..(G....:..,_-_T~J (1 + p)(1 + 1t:) D,
+ +
(1 + 1t:) P,
(1 + p;)(1 + 1t:) D,'
(1 + 1t~) P,
t:.M,
- -- (25)
Let the real level ofdomestic debt be d" the real level offoreign debt be d:, the real
government deficit be 8" and the real value of seignorage be at = t:.M,jP,+!. Taking
expectations conditional on <1>, and rewriting yields
(26)
Rearranging
16II, + (1 + p';)d,* - 0,
d = - +
, (l + p)
(27)
The general solution for debt will be of the form
d, = F, + fJ,
where F, is the fundamental solution and B, is a rational bubble.
Iterating n periods forward yields
(28)
There will not be a bubble if the following transversality condition is fulfilled
= 0
(30)
If there is no bubble, then the solution to equation (6) is





(31)Ifthe transversality condition (30) is violated, the solution will be
d = • (32)
For the bubble to conform to the government budget constraint (4), it must evolve
in the following way
E[B.+ l l4iJ - (1 + p)B. = 0
Solutions to equation (33) take the form




Once again, the AR process governing the bubble is not stationarywhich means that
differencing cannot eliminate a bubble from the data if it exists. Agaln, the bubble is not
really a bubble. The lack of cointegration of the domestic debt, foreign debt, the primary
deficit, and seignorage signifies insolvency of the government or in other words that the
dynamic government budget constraint does not hold.
18IV The Stationarity Properties ofGovernment Debt
Suppose the time series vector X, = [B" d" d'" a,] is first difference stationary. By the
Wold decomposition theorem, X, can be represented
(1 - L)X, = J.L + C(L)v, (36)
where CCL) is a 4 x 4 matrix in the lag operator, /.l. is a drift term, and v, is a vector white
noise process with v, = [VI,,, V"" V"" v",]. We can form the net of internal debt interest
government deficit which is the numerator of the expressions for internal government debt
in equations (31) and (32), by multiplying X, by the cointegrating vector E' = [1, p, (1 + p'), -
1j.1' This yields the following expression
(l - L)p/X, = p/J.L + p/C(L)v, (37)
One canuse equation (37) to rationally forecast the value offuture governmentdebt.
Substituting equation (37) into equation (27) and iterating forward, one finds the solution
to the value of d,. As Trehan and Walsh (1991) show, equation (37) implies that if
intertemporal budgets are satisfied (no bubbles), real government debt will follow the
BAn implicit assumption of the analysis is that the country in question cannot borrow
oninternational markets. Hence, the real (dollar) value offoreign debt stays constant. This
assumption is in line with the experiences of both countries over this period.
19following process14
(l - L)dt+l = a, + pfl, + (1 + p;)d,* - a, = Il'"" + D(L)v,
P
(38)
where D(L)v, is stationary. Equation (38) implies that the first difference ofthe real debt
is stationary or, equivalently, that the primary deficit, the stock of internal debt, the stock
of foreign debt, and seignorage are cointegrated with cointegrating vector E' = [1, p"
(l+p',), -1].
Because of data limitations, the tests for internal debt bubbles carried out in this
paper looks at the stationarity of the first difference of the internal debt. Data onprimary
government deficits is notoriously suspect, especially in Brazil, as well as the fact that a
consistent time series is virtually unobtainable. Further, estimating the actual level of
seignorage collected from discretely collected data will understate the true level as the
monetary base expands in a more or less continuous fashion. For more on this point, see
Welch, Primo Braga, and Andre (1987) and Cukierman (1988).
14Trehan and Walsh (1991) extend their results of (1988) to the case where the real
interest rate on government debt is not constant, as in this case. Their results show that if
p, is a stochastic process bound strictly below by A>0 in expected value and (l-L)d, is a
stationary process, then intertemporal budget balance is satisfied. Real interest rates on
internal government debt were positive in both Argentina and Brazil over the period.
20V Inflation Bubble Test Results
Ifinflation and monetary growth are CI(I,I), then rational bubbles cannot exist. In
a prior study, I showed that over the in the pre-Cruzado Plan (1974-1986) period for Brazil
and the pre-Austral (1970-1985) period for Argentina, inflation and money growth are
CI(I,I) and, hence, rational bubbles did not exist. We look now atthe post-incomes policies
cum monetary reform period to see if the monetary reforms created rational bubbles. The
data for Brazil are monthly data from March 1986 through February 1990." The Argentine
data are monthly data for the period June 1985 through December 1989.'6 Figure 3 shows
inflation and money (M" M" and M,) growth while figure 4 shows the growth in real
balances in Argentina. Figures 5 and 6 show the same variables for Brazil respectively.
Growth in real balances appears to be stationary in both countries. Tables 1 and 2 show
the augmentedDickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips andPerron(1988) tests for stationarity
ofBrazilian inflation and money growth and the first differences, respectively. Tables 3 and
4 test the stationarity ofArgentine inflation and monetary growth and the first differences
of the same variables.
The Brazilian inflation rate, M, growth rate, and M, growth rate significantly reject
the null hypothesis of normality, hence the more relevant statistics are the Phillips and
Perron tests for these three variables." Only M, growth shows any evidence ofstationarity
"TheBraziliandatacomprised the different monetary aggregates monetarybase, M" M"
and M, , and the wholesale price index (IGP-DI). The sources ofthe datawere Conjuntura
Economica and the Funda<;ao Getulio Vargas.
'"The Argentine data comprised the monetary aggregates M" M" and M" and the
wholesale price index published by lNDEC.
"The test of normality is based upon those developed in Jarque and Bera (1980).
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Brazil: Tests of a Unit Root 1986:3-1990:2
a. Null Hypotbesis: Variable has a Unit Root (no time trend)
Variable Pbillips-Perron Test") Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test")
T-ralin T-ratin
inflation(b) -o.n -0.68
money growth (MI ) -4.32'" -2.19
money growth (M,)(b) 0.29 0.085
money growth (M,)(b) 0.02 -0.40
b: Null Hypothesis: Variable has Unit Root (with time trend)
Variable Phillips-Perron Test'·) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test")
T-ralio T-ratlo
inflation(b) -2.20 -2.33
money growth (MI) -6.62"· -4.13'"
money growth (M,)(b) -2.59 -1.47
money growth (M,)(b) -2.95 -1.72
Notes: (a)
(b)
The tests used one lag of the differenced variables. The number of lags were chosen so that
the 0(21) statistic when a trend was included and 0(22) statistic with no trend did not reject
the null hypothesis of stationary residuals in the augmented regression at the 10% level.
Variable significantlyviolates normalityassumptioneitherbecause ofskewness orkurtosis using
the tests developed in largoe and Bera (1980).
• signifies significance at the a=O.lO level, •• signifies significance at the a=0.051evel, and ••• signifies
significance at the a =0.01 level.
26Table 2
Brazil: Tests of a Unit Root 1986:3-1990:2
a Null Hypothesis: Variable has a Unit Root (no time trend)
Variable Phillips-Perron Test,a, Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test")
T-ratlo T-ratio
Llinflation(b) -7.04-" -4.61'"
Llmoney growth (M,) -12.74'" -8.97"-
Llmoney growth (M,)(b) -8.59'" -5.85'"
Llmoney growth (M,) -9.61"· -6.01"·
b' Null Hypothesis' Variable has Unit Root (with time trend)
Variable PhillIps-Perron Test'" Augmeuted Dickey-Fuller Test,a)
T-ratio T-ratio
LIinflation(b) -11.31'"' -2.61"
Llmoney growth (M,) -12.77'" -9.20'"
Llmoney growth (M,)(b) -8.78'" -6.13'"
Llmoney growth (M,)(b) -9.73"· -8.62"·
Notes: (a)
(b)
The tests used one lag of the differenced variables. The number of lags were chosen so that
the 0(21) statistic when a trend was included and 0(22) statistic with no trend did not reject
the null hypothesis of stationary residuals in the augmented regression at the 10% level
Variablesignificantlyviolates normalityassumptioneitherbecause ofskewness orkurtosisusing
the tests developed in Jargue and Bera (1980).
a signifies significance at the «=0.10 level, aa signifies significance at thea=0.05Ievel, and aaa signifies
significance at the «=0.01 level
27Table 3
Argentina: Tests of a Unit Root 1985:7-1989:12
a. Null Hypothesis: Variable has a Unit Root (no time trend)
Variable Pbillips-Perron Test") Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test'"
T-ralio T-ralio
inflation(b) -2.86' -2.54
money growth (M,)(b) -622"· -4.24·"
money growth (M,)(b) -4.98"· -3.66'"
money growth (M,)(b) -3.00" -4.39'"
b: Null Hypothesis: Variable has Unit Root (with time trend)
Variable Phillips-Perron Test'·) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test'·)
T-ralio T-ratio
inf1ation(b) -3.44' -3.15
money growth (M,)(b) -6.49
uo -4.76'"
money growth (M,)(b) -5.71"" -4.08'"
money growth (M,)(b) -5.37'" -3.82'"
Notes: (a)
(b)
The tests used one lag of the differenced variables. The number of lags were chosen so that
the 0(21) statistic when a trend was included and 0(22) statistic with no trend did not reject
the null hypothesis of stationary residuals in the augmented regression at the 10% level.
Variable significantlyviolates normalityassumption eitherbecauseofskewness orkurtosis using
the tests developed in Jargue and Bera (1980).
• signifies significance at thea =0.10 level, •• signifies significance at the a=0.05Ievel, and ••• signifies
significance at the a=0.01 level.
28Table 4
Argentina: Tests of a Unit Root 1985-1990
a. Null Hypotbesis: Variable has a Unit Root (no time trend)
Variable Phillips-Perron Test'a) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test,a)
T-ratio T-ratlo
Llinflation(b) -7.47"· -5.73·"
Llmoney growth (MI)(b) -13.28'" -7.96·"
Llmoney growth (M,)(b) -12.26'" ~.6(;··
Llmoney growth (M,)(b) -12.14'" ~.20'"
b: Null Hypotbesis: Variable has Unit Root (with time trend)
Variable Phillips-Perron Test,a) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test(a)
T-ratlo T-ratio
Llinflation(b) -7.40"· -3.37'
Llmoney growth (MI)(O) -13.07'" -7.86·"
Llmoney growth (M,)(b) -13.99·" -5.1'1"
Llmoney growth (M,)(b) -4.39'" -3.00
Notes: (a)
(b)
The tests used tbree lags ofthe differenced variables oftbe MI, and M, equations and one lag
oftbe differenced variables in the inflation and M, equations. The number oflags were chosen
so that the 0(21) statistic when a trend was included and 0(22) statistic with no trend did not
reject the null hypothesis ofstationary residuals in the augmented regression at the 10%level.
Variablesignificantlyviolatesnormalityassumptioneitherbecauseofskewness orkurtosisusing
tbe tests developed in Jargue and Bera (1980).
• signifies significance at thea ~0.10 level, •• signifies significance at thea =0.05 level, and ••• signifies
significance at tbe a=O.Ollevel.
29from the regressions with a trend at the 5% level from table 1. On the other hand, the first
differences of all four variables in table 2 are significantly stationary at the 1% level. The
assumption that money growth and inflation are 1(1) is consistent with the data."
The Argentine inflation rate in table 3 is weakly stationary at the 10% level. The
money growth rates are significantly stationary atthe 5% level. Table 4 shows that the first
differences ofall variables including inflation are stationary. These results indicate that the
likelihood ofa rational inflationary bubble inArgentina are extremely remote as the money
growth rates are stationarywhile the inflation rate seems to be marginally stationary. A first
implication of these results is that there may be two cointegrating vectors in terms of
inflation and money growth rates. A second one is that the price level and the stock of
money in Argentina are cointegrated, a condition if satisfied rules out the existence in a
stronger way the cointegration conditions discussed above.
Cointegrationmeans that(non-stationary) timeseriesvariables tend to move together
such that a linear combination of them is stationary. Some have interpreted cointegration
as representing a long run equilibrium relationship. Cointegration also has implications for
the statistical analysis of these series. Further, differencing X, d times to generate a
stationary time series and then estimating a VAR based upon the differenced series is
inappropriate in the presence of cointegration. Granger (1981) develops what has corne to
be known as the Granger representation theorem: Ifthe (px1) vector time series X, (p=2
in this case) is first difference stationary, i.e. 1(1), and cointegrated, i.e. b=1, there exists an
l'Ifinflationand money growth were stationary in levels, no rational inflationarybubbles
could exist. The cointegration tests, however, would be irrelevant.
30error correction form
(39)
where IT = aB', B' = [B.. B.] is the cointegrating vector, a' = [a.. a.] is the error correction
coefficient (or speed of adjustment).
Animportant point of this theorem is that the VARshould incorporate the long run
equilibrium relationship between the levels. A VAR based purely upon differences would
exclude this relevant information in addition to displaying infinite variance.
In general, there can exist (p-l) independent cointegrating vectors. A weakness in
the Engle and Granger (1987) approach is that it offered no clear criterion for choosing the
number of cointegrating vectors. Johansen and Juselius (1990) take a general maximum
likelihoodapproachto choosingthe numberofindependentcointegratingvectors, estimating
IT, a, B', and testing restrictions on a and B. Their technique is based upon the following
general version of equation (1).19
(40)
The analysis of the negative of the growth in real money balances looks at the
behavior of B' = [1, -1] of the vector time series XI = [7T" J.L']' The maximum likelihood
'9'fhe IT matrix is the same in equation (1) and equation (2). It can be shown that the
level variable can take on any lag from 1 to k without affecting IT. The coefficients on the
lagged differenced variables, of course, change.
31estimates for Brazil appear in tables 5 through 7.'" All monetary aggregates show one
cointegrating vector. The cointegrating vector B' is not significantly different from [1, -1]
and each component is significantly different from zero. The coefficient on the equilibrium
error term a showed significant adjustment in monetary aggregates and not in the inflation
rate except in the case of the estimates with M3• A further discussion of these results,
however, is beyond the scope ofthis presentpaper. Since the tests conducted above showed
that inflation and the monetary aggregates M, and M, were non-normal, a Phillips and
Perron test was conducted on the growth in real balances. These test significantly rejected
non-stationarity for all monetary aggregates.
The results for Argentina appear in tables 8 through 10. In all cases, the n matrix
is full rank, Le. r=p=2, at the 5% significance level confirming suspicions based upon the
Phillips and Perron tests above that inflation and money growth are stationary time series.
21
Hence, one cannot perform tests of restrictions on the B' matrix. Instead, we impose B' =
[1, -1] and test the stationarity of (the negative of) the growth in real balances using both
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, the latter being the more relevant due to the non-
normalities in the series. Growth in real money balances is significantly stationary at the
1% level showing that rational inflationary bubbles were absent in Argentina as well as
Brazil in the post-heterodox policy period.
"'The Johansen and Juselius (1990) procedure assumes normality. The equations are
estimated using RATS 3.10 software.
2lThe fact that the matrixnhas full rank indicates thatthe vector process X. is stationary
[Johansen and Juselius 1990: 170].
32Table Sa
Brazil: Tests for number (r) of Cointegrating Vectors for X. = ['IT" ILt) with M,(')
H,:r=O H,:r=1
TRACE TESTS H,:r=2 H,:r=2
test statistic 21.41''' 0.01
MAXIMUM H,:r=O H,:r=1
EIGENVALUE H,:r=1 H,:r=2






Notes: (a) One lag was used in these maximum likelihood estimates. The lag
structure was chosen by adding lags until the Q(22) statistic did not
reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
•• signifies rejection of H, at a 5% significance level, ••• signifies rejection
of H, at a 1% significance level.
33Table 5b
Brazil: Tests on B' and a for inflation and M,
H.:Bv =1, B.=-1, H o: B~=O H.: B.=O
X'(,)=0.126 X'(I)=15,858'" X'(I)=19.46'"




Final Values ofB and a:
~ = [~1]
~ = [o.~]
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests on the Final B'X,")
Ho: B'X, is non-stationary
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -4.77'"
Phillips-Perron -6,824'"
Notes: (a) One lag was used in these tests of stationarity. The lag structure was
chosen by adding lags until the Q(22) statistic did not reject the null
hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals,
•• signifies rejection of Ho at a 5% significance level, ••• signifies rejection
ofHo at a 1% significance level.
34Table 6a
Brazil: Tests for number (r) of Cointegrating Vectors for X. = [71"" ~l with M,<')
He:r=O He:r=1
TRACE TESTS H,:r=2 H,:r=2
test statistic 25.19'" 0.001
MAXIMUM H.:r=O He:r=1
EIGENVALUE H,:r=1 H,:r=2






Notes: (a) One lag was used in the maximum likelihood estimates. The lag
structure was chosen by adding lags until the 0(22) statistic did not
reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
** signifies rejection of He at a 5% significance level, ••• signifies rejection
ofH. at a 1% significance level.
35Table 6b
Brazil: Tests on B' and a for inflation and M,
H o:Bw=1,8.=-1, Ho: 8w=0 R: 8.=0
,,'(,)=0.256 "'(1)=24.896'" "'(1) =18.22'"




Final Values ofB and a:
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests on the Final 8'X,(')
R: B'X, is non-stationary
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -4.44'"
Phillips-Perron -5.763'"
Notes: (a) One lag was used in these tests of stationarity. The lag structure was
chosen by adding lags until the Q(22) statistic did not reject the null
hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
•• signifies rejection of Ho at a 5% significance level, ... signifies rejection
ofHo at a 1% significance level.
36Table 7a
Brazil: Tests for number (r) of Cointegrating Vectors for X. = [1T" IL,] with M,(')
Ho:r=O Ho:r=l
TRACE TESTS H,:r=2 H,:r=2
test statistic 24.93'" 0.05
MAXIMUM H,:r=O H,:r=1
EIGENVALUE H,:r=l H,:r=2






Notes: (a) One lag was used in these maximum likelihood estimates. The lag
structure was chosen by adding lags until the Q(22) statistic did not
reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
.. signifies rejection of Ho at a 5% significance level, *.. signifies rejection
of Hoat a 1% significance level.
37Table 7b
Brazil: Tests on B' and a for inflation and M,








He: a7 =0 He: a.=O
Unrestricted 2 669'" X
2









Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests on the Final B'X.(.)
He: B'X. is non-stationary
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -4.556'"
Phillips-Perron -6.197'"
Notes: (a) One lag was used in these tests of stationarity, The lag structure was
chosen by adding lags until the Q(22) statistic did not reject the null
hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
** signifies rejection of He at a 5% significance level, *** signifies rejection
of He at a 1% significance level.
38Table Sa
Argentina: Tests for number (r) of Cointegrating Vectors for X, = [1T" JL,j with M/')
Ho:r=O Ho:r=1
TRACE TESTS H,:r=2 H.:r=2
test statistic 26.38'" 6.42"
MAXIMUM He:r=O Ho:r=1
EIGENVALUE H,:r=l H.:r=2
test statistic 29.95'" 6.42"
Notes: (a) One lag was used in these maximum likelihood estimates. The lag
structure was chosen by adding lags until the 0(22) statistic did not
reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
** signifies rejection of Hoat a 5% significance level, **. signifies rejection
of He at a 1% significance level.
39Table 8b
Argentina: Tests on B' and a for inflation and M1
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests on Growth in Real Balances(')
He: B'X. is non-stationary
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -3.SS"·
Phillips-Perron -5.3S"·
Notes: (a) One lag was used in these tests of stationarity. The lag structure was
chosen by adding lags until the 0(22) statistic did not reject the null
hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
•• signifies rejection of H. at a 5% significance level, ••• signifies rejection
of He at a 1% significance level.
40Table 9a
Argentina: Tests for number (r) of Cointegrating Vectors for Xt = ['IT" J.Ltl with M,(·j
Ho:r=O Ho:r=1
TRACE TESTS H,:r=2 H,:r=2
test statistic 21.79'" 4.566"
MAXIMUM H,:r=O Ho:r=1
EIGENVALUE H,:r=1 H,:r=2
test statistic 17.23'" 4.566"
Notes: (a) One lag was used in the maximum likelihood estimates. The lag
structure was chosen by adding lags until the 0(22) statistic did not
reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
** signifies rejection of Hoat a 5% significance level, *** signifies rejection
of H, at a 1% significance level.
41Table 9b
Argentina: Tests on B' and a for inflation and M2
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests on Growth in Real Balances(')
H,,: B'X. is non-stationary
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -3.98'"
Phillips-Perron -5.21'"
Notes: (a) One lag was used in these tests of stationarity. The lag structure was
chosen by adding lags until the 0(22) statistic did not reject the null
hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
** signifies rejection of He at a 5% significance level, *** signifies rejection
of He at a 1% significance level.
42Table lOa
Argentina: Tests for number (r) of Cointegrating Vectors for X, = [1T" ~l] with M,("
He:r=O Ha:r=1
TRACE TESTS H,:r=2 H,:r=2
test statistic 20.62'" 5.96"
MAXIMUM He:r=O He:r=1
EIGENVALUE H,:r=1 H,:r=2
test statistic 14.67" 5.96"
Notes: (a) One lag was used in these maximum likelihood estimates. The lag
structure was chosen by adding lags until the Q(22) statistic did not
reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
** signifies rejection of He at a 5% significance level, *** signifies rejection
of He at a 1% significance level.
43Table lOb
Argentina: Tests on B' and a for inflation and M,
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests on Growth in Real Balances(')
Ho: B'X. is non-stationary
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -3.46'"
Phillips-Perron -4.71"""
Notes: (a) One lag was used in these tests of stationarity. The lag structure was
chosen by adding lags until the Q(22) statistic did not reject the null
hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
** signifies rejection of Ho at a 5% significance level, *** signifies rejection
of Ho at a 1% significance level.
44VI Debt Bubble Test Results
As shown in section IV, a real debt bubble cannot occur, i.e. intertemporal budget
balance is maintained, if real debt is first difference stationary. The Brazilian data are
monthly observations on bond debt outside of the Central Bank deflated by the wholesale
price index." The Argentine debt are internal debt in U.S. dollars evaluated at the average
monthly "free-market" exchange rate from October 1986 to June 1989.'" The level of real
governmentdebt andits first differences inArgentinaappearinfigures 7 and 8, respectively,
while the same variables for Brazil appear in figures 9 and 10. In each country, the level
of real debt appears to be non-stationary while the first differences show mean reversion.
Tables 11 and 12 show the results of the formal tests of stationarity for Brazil and
Argentina. Real internal government debt in both Brazil and Argentina is first difference
stationary at a significance level of 1%. The necessary conditions for thegovernment's
intertemporal budget constraint to beviolated, as in the case ofan inflationary bubble, are
"Ideally, one would like to have monthly observations on the net debt of the public
sector as public sector entities hold some ofthis bond debt as well as borrow in otherforms
such as loans, etc.. A monthly time series ofnet debt, however, is currently unavailable and
is only published on an annual basis. For a full discussion how net debt is calculated, see
Banco Central do Brasil (1986). The data comes from the Banco Central do Brasi~ Brasil:
Pro~rama Econ6mico. various issues. Further, the nominal debt for Brazil is deflated by a
geometric average of the adjacent price indexes as the debt is the end of month balance
while the price index measures on the fifteenth day of the same month. The results,
however, are not sensitive to the choice of price deflator.
"'Data for Argentine internal debt are calculated by the author from Estudio M. A. M.
Broda y Asoc. Carta Economica, various issues. The data are monthly values for internal
government debt converted to U.S. dollars at the average parallel market exchange rate and
include the debt of the Central Bank.
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46Figure 8
Argentina: First Differences of Real Public Debt













Brazil: Real Internal Public Debt March1986 to February 1990
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Brazil: Tests of a Unit Root and Time Trend 1986:3-1990:2
Real Internal Government Debt
a. Null Hypothesis: Variable has a Unit Root (with time trend)
Variable Phillips-Perron Test Augmented Dickey-Fuller
T-ratio Test(B)
T-ratio
areal government debt(b) -5.02'" -4.56'"
b: Null Hypothesis: Variable has Unit Root (with no time trend)
Variable Phillips-Perron Test Augmented Dickey-Fuller
T-ratio Test(B)
T-ratio
Meal government debt(b) -4.94'" -4.50'"
Notes: (a) One lag was used in these tests of stationarity. The lag structure was
chosen by adding lags until the Q(22) statistic did not reject the null
hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
(b) Variable significantly violates normality assumption either because of
skewness or kurtosis using the tests developed in Jargue and Bera
(1980).
* signifies significance at the a =0.10 level, ** signifies significance at the
a=0.05 level, and *** signifies significance at the a=0.01 level.
50Table 12
Argentina: Tests of a Unit Root and Time Trend 1986:3-1990:2
Real Internal Government Debt
a. Null Hypothesis: Variable has a Unit Root (with time trend)
Variable Phillips-Perron Test Augmented Dickey-Fuller
T-ratio Test")
T-ratio
areal government debt -4.17'" -4.17'"
b: Null Hypothesis: Variable has Unit Root (no time trend)
Variable Phillips-Perron Test Augmented Dickey-Fuller
T-ratio Test(')
T-ratio
areal government debt -4.07""" -4.07'"
Notes: (a) Zero lags were used in these tests of stationarity. The lag structure
was chosen by adding lags until the Q(22) statistic did not reject the
null hypothesis of autocorrelated residuals.
• signifies significance at the a=0,10 level, •• signifies significance at the
a=0.05 level, and ••• signifies significance at the a=O.Ollevel.
51significantly rejected for Brazil and Argentina.
VII Conclusions
This paper endeavored to find evidence of rational inflationary bubbles and real
internal debt bubbles in Brazil and Argentina. The first section described a classical model
of inflation and the possibility of rational inflationary bubbles. The second looked at the
stationaritycharacteristics ofrational bubbles and showed thatifinflation and money growth
are cointegrated, rational bubbles cannot exist. The third sectiondeveloped a model ofreal
internal debt. The fourth section looked at the stationarity properties ofreal government
internal debt. The fifth section presented evidence that inflation and money growth are
cointegratedfor both Brazil and Argentinaand, hence, no inflationarybubbles exist. Finally,
thesixth section showed that real debt in ArgentinaandBrazilwas first difference stationary
and, hence, no real internal debt bubbles existed in either country.
The conclusionwhich emerges from this empirical study is that inflationin Argentina
and Brazil is driven primarily by fundamentals as opposed to purely speculative bubbles.
Further, seignorage adjusts in a stable way to render real government debt stationary. The
implication ofthis last statement is that the real level of the government deficit inclusive of
interest never reached a level which could not be financed by seignorage, the condition that
would imply an ever increasing growth rate of money, inflation, and debt. In spite of the
fact that the real monetary base in each of these countries has shrunk dramatically,
seignorage adjusts to make the government's internal debt accumulation stable.
These empirical regularities call for a brief interpretation of the Argentine and
52Brazilian inflation experiences over the period in question. The Argentine excursion into
hyperinflation at the end of 1989 reflects a speculative attack on the Central Banks foreign
currency holdings to the collapse of stabilization programs due to the inconsistency of lack
offiscal reforms combined with fixed exchange rates. The role the internal debt played in
the Argentine case was that the cost ofborrowing domestically rose on fears ofan exchange
rate collapse. Without adjustment of the primary deficit to finance these interest charges,
the government had to increase seignorage hastening the arrival ofthe collapse. A similar
story can betold for the Braziliancase. The Workers Party (PI) presidential candidateLuis
Ignacio da Silva orLulainthe 1989 presidential elections promised a unilateral government
moratorium on the internal and external debts. As Lula's campaigngained momentum, real
interest rates rose reflecting the risk of government default [Bastos Marques and Werlang
1990]. Again, as no fiscal adjustmentwas forthcoming especially by the lame duck President
Sarney, seignorage increased accelerating the inflationrate. The evidence presented above,
however, indicates that in each case the process was not self generating, i.e. a debt led
continuous acceleration of the inflation rate was not at hand. Rather, the higher interest
costs ofgovernment finance quickly moved each economy to a higher inflation equilibrium.
Certainly, this study suffers from a number of shortcomings. Firstly, the short time
series limits the strength of these tests, especially in case of testing the dynamic budget
constraint. The main problem lies in the fact that any finite series can be differenced to
stationarity. Thefact thatsignificant stationarityobtainedafter differencing only a few times
lends credence to the results. Anotherwell know qualification ofthe results is the fact that
the stationarity and cointegration tests are notoriously low in power in addition to the fact
53the size of the tests depends upon the number oflags used in the regressions. Again, the
fact that non-stationarity was significantly rejected at low levels ofintegration suggests that
the results are reasonable.
The study showed that rational inflationary bubbles generated outside of the
"fundamentals" are not part of the inflationary processes of Argentina and Brazil. The
possibility of "intrinsic bubbles" or bubbles which are functions of the fundamentals as in
Froot and Obstfeld (1989) may prove useful in explaining the explosiveness of inflation in
these two countries. Further, the linear methods employed here may not pick up important
non-linearities which have been the focus ofthe recent "target zone" literature on exchange
rates statingwith Krugman (1988). Bubbles which appearas non-linearities during exchange
rate collapse may go unnoticed by the techniques used here. Understanding the link
between hyperinflation and speculative attack, especially in the Argentine case, along the
lines of Krugman and Rotemberg (1990), should aid in the analysis of the inflation
experiences of these countries. Finally, tests of the classical model with well defined
alternative hypotheses are still needed. Such investigation, however, is left to future
research.
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